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Abstract: Europe is less dynamic than other areas in the world.  The European Union will lose its 
position as the largest economic region, with the share in world output decreasing to less than 15% 
in 2050.  This article designs a strategy based on which Europe can increase its internal dynamics, 
connect with its dynamic neighborhood and stabilize its eastern and southern regions.  These 
regions are currently searching for development paths different from those in the US and China.  
The envisaged strategy learns from past errors, counteracts “my country first calls”, balances 
uneven trade and investment pacts, and prevents land and resource grabbing.  A new partnership 
strategy with neighbors in Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa will enable Europe to overcome its 
growth fatigue.  It could help to reshape globalization and convert the current “ring of fire” into a 
“ring of friends”.  Then, together with its neighbors, Europe could still be an important economic 
region in 2050, on par with China and larger than the US plus its neighbors. 
Keywords:  European Neighborhood Policy; Marshall Plan for Africa; Dependency theory; 
Migration and education; Stability vs. "Ring of Fire" 
JEL Classification: E02, E61, F13, F42 
1.  Why Europe Needs an Active Partnership Policy 
1.1  Dynamic markets help to overcome European growth fatigue 
Economic dynamics has slowed in Europe, even before the financial crisis, but more 
significantly in the period thereafter. The process of catching up with the US in terms of per capita 
income – a stylized fact since WWII – stopped in the nineties. In the years following the financial 
crisis, European growth was very slow, such that output in 2016 (measured by the real GDP of the 
EU 28) surpassed the one of 2008 by only 5%, compared to 12% in the US and 60% in China 
(cumulative figures). Unemployment approached 10% (2014) in the Euro area, and 8% in the EU 
27, dropping slightly during the recovery of 2016/18.  
In contrast, most EU neighborhood countries avail of dynamic markets. The Black Sea region, 
North Africa, Turkey and the Middle East reported GDP growth rates of 3% or more between 2000 
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and 2017, leading to a cumulative growth of GDP for the European neighborhood since 2000 of 
110%. Catching up even persists under political instability. Medium and long-term growth up to 
2050 is predicted to lie above 3% p.a. as compared to 1-2% for industrialized countries. The 
neighborhood countries thus offer highly dynamic markets, producing themselves at rather low cost, 
at a short geographic distance to Europe. 
The European neighborhood in this document
1
 refers to non-European regions which are 
geographically close to the European Union (EU), but which are not members and do not have the 
intention or prospect of accession. This region comprises Africa (including Sub-Sahara), the (Near 
and) Middle East, the Black Sea area and other successor states of the Soviet Union (labeled as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States by the IMF). Russia should also be included in a European 
neighborhood policy, even if this currently appears beyond the realm of European policy. In this 
definition, the European neighborhood is very heterogeneous, comprising catching up countries 
with stable governments, but also extremely poor ones.  
1.2  Stability limits illegal and disruptive migration 
The European population is ageing, and the potential workforce (defined conservatively by 
constant employment shares per age group) is predicted to decline by 20 million by 2030 and by 
more than 100 million up to 2050 (UNDP, 2016). Even if participation rates increase and the skill 
mismatch is reduced (Aiginger, 2016), some net migration will be needed to stabilize labor supply. 
Complementing these demand aspects (the pull factors) of migration is the “supply” or push 
migration driven e.g. by political conflicts or environmental catastrophes. It will only imperfectly 
meet the numbers, age structure and qualification requested by demand. Consequently, the most 
recent wave of refugees from the Middle East and Africa has unleashed formidable resistance from 
European citizens, although this is not corroborated by objective numbers. Europe inhabits today 
about 80 million international migrants, some 30.2% of worldwide migration. In contrast, Europe 
provided shelter to refugees (and asylum seekers) of just 3.5 million persons or some 13.5% of 
worldwide refugees (Table 1).  
Table 1. International migrants and refugees in mid-2017 (stocks) 
International migrants & 
refugees 
Area of destination 
International 
migrants according 
Refugees and 
asylum seekers 
 Millions Percent Millions Percent 
  Europe 77.9   30.2   3.5   13.5   
  Asia 79.6   30.9   14.7   56.7   
  Africa 24.7   9.6   6.3   24.2   
  North America 57.7   22.4   1.0   3.7   
  Latin America and the Caribbean 9.5   3.7   0.4   1.6   
  Oceania 8.3   3.2   0.1   0.3   
  Total 257.7   100.0   25.9   100.0   
Data source: UN (2017a) 
                                                 
1
 Note that our definition is not entirely identical with that of the official documents about the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 
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The future potential migration from Africa is predicted to amount to 80 million people per 
year. This continent’s population will rise from currently 1.3 to 2.5 billion in 2050 and then to 4.5 
billion in 2100 (UN, 2017b). The push of migrants from Africa is determined by the high 
population growth which meets with a weak sanitary infrastructure, insufficient health services, 
climate change and inadequate education systems (Schmid and Borchers, 2010).  Europe primarily 
needs medium to highly skilled immigration, while the actual qualification of migrants is very 
heterogeneous across different countries (higher from Syria, lower from Afghanistan and Sub-
Saharan Africa).  
High population growth plus low qualification imply that the larger part of the solution has to 
be to stimulate dynamics and job creation in the neighborhood countries themselves (for Africa, 20 
million new jobs are needed per year) and to upgrade skills. Jobs near the countries of origin, e.g. in 
special zones or peace oases, allow for the return of migrants after crises have subsided.  
1.3  Historic responsibility  
In addition to economic arguments, Europe feels an obligation to support stability and 
recovery in its Southern neighborhood due to its historic responsibility and partial guilt. In the past, 
Europe often colonized these countries by force; it defined borders in disrespect of history or 
cultural homogeneity, it installed governments and exploited the resources of its colonies without 
providing or improving economic structures, increasing food supply, supporting endogenous firms 
and respecting environmental limits. In more recent times, Europe exported agricultural goods in 
oversupply, thus implicitly reducing the potential of an endogenous food industry in neighborhood 
countries (Lungu, 2018). At the same time, Europe maintained non-tariff barriers for imports of 
agricultural products from Africa. 
Recalling these historical facts does not mean that European nations, governments and civic 
organizations did not also promote and enhance development and improve wellbeing (e.g. health). 
However, Europe has not made democratic principles, poverty reduction or gender rights a 
condition for trade and investment, and weapons have been provided to all regimes whenever 
possible. Reluctantly, Europe did connect to secular bottom-up movements like the Arab Spring 
(Wurm, 2018).  As a consequence of past failures and recent negligence, the image of Europe in the 
neighborhood countries is not the best, a factor which has to be taken into account in delineating a 
new strategy. Europe can either try to develop fair partnerships with its neighborhood and support 
economic and political stabilization or it will be confronted with new political structures indifferent 
or even hostile towards Europe.  
2. Past  and  Present  Attempts 
2.1  Recovery programs after World War II 
One major assistance program initiated after World War II is generally considered a success: 
By establishing the European Recovery Program (ERP), the so-called Marshall Plan, the US 
decided to invest their taxpayers’ money in supporting the reconstruction of the European economy 
on the condition that the goods purchased with this money were to come from the US. The drivers 
behind the ERP were a mixture of altruistic and egoistic motives. It created investment 
opportunities for the US and prevented Europe from turning communist. Total assistance was 
estimated at USD 13 billion for 1948-52, which amounts to around USD 130 billion at today's 
prices (Machado, 2008). This was 12.5% of US GDP at the time, and 10% of the GDP of the 
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recipient countries. Its contribution to economic growth in Europe has been estimated at 0.5% p.a. 
by Eichengreen (1996).  
While the ERP increased intra-European trade and boosted tangible investments, it was 
complemented in 1961 by the Fulbright Program for intangible investment, concentrating on 
knowledge transfer and improving cultural relations and mutual understanding. The positive impact 
on Europe has been experienced by generations of European students and researchers who have 
improved their knowledge and that of their home country through participation in the program. 
Learning from ERP and Fulbright, we should bear in mind that the circumstances existing in 
the European neighborhood today do by far not resemble those at the time of the post-WW II 
programs. Western Europe before WWII had been a highly developed and industrialized area, with 
a skilled workforce and a resolute will to rebuild the destroyed industrial base and infrastructure. 
Today’s European neighborhood is far more heterogeneous across regions and countries and even 
within most countries. In many of them, no stable government exists, regions are often ruled by 
tribes and production is dominated by agriculture. 
2.2  Development policy and dependency theory 
The literature on development policy is rather controversial. On the one hand, many authors 
and organizations call for increasing the public and private means for development and fighting 
poverty (Sachs, 2005, 2009). They criticize that actual aid by far misses goals, or that development 
assistance does not even match military expenditure. On the other hand, there is the critique that the 
support provided by industrialized countries to the developing world may have no effect or even a 
negative impact (Moyo, 2010) by discouraging reforms, endogenous innovations and national 
development strategies. Deaton (2013) demands stopping the mass of external aid flows to the 
poorest countries of the world, since it is most likely doing harm, not good. Bodomo (2017) argues 
against providing financial support in exchange for good governance since this might lead to 
instable political systems. 
International organizations (OECD, IMF, European Commission) urge their members to raise 
development assistance, and Sachs is strongly on the side of this approach calculating huge funds 
needed to end poverty (and contradicting Collier, 2016, and Deaton, 2013). The OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) suggested that official development assistance (ODA), 
such as grants and concessional loans, should amount to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI). 
DAC members have generally accepted this target, at least as a long-term objective, although actual 
implementation has only partially been successful. In 2016 the absolute net contributions to ODA, 
including countries outside of DAC, amounted to about USD 155 billion (OECD, 2017). The EU 
and its Member States are collectively the world’s biggest contributors to development assistance, 
providing EUR 75.5 billion in 2016 (European Commission, 2017)
2
.  
Complementing programs of international organizations, the EU has a history of commitments 
to Eastern and Southern neighbors in order to foster stability, security and prosperity. The main 
instrument is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which was launched in 2004 and comprises 
joint programs with partner countries in key priority areas. Following a revision in 2015, these 
                                                 
2 The EU’s development policy goes back to 1958. 
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include (i) differentiation in order to recognize the different aspirations of each country; (ii) joint 
ownership, based on both partners' needs and EU interests; and (iii) more flexibility in the use of 
EU instruments. The revision switches from the “less for less” to the "more for more" principle, 
making the magnitude of the support dependent on the progress a partner country in reforms 
(European Commission, 2003, 2017). 
The dependency theory claims that – under free trade and very different levels of income, 
technological and financial strength – resources may even flow from the poor periphery to the 
wealthy core.  Although many countries succeeded in reducing poverty dramatically in the last two 
decades, there are several “development traps”. Poor countries in open markets might specialize on 
products with low income elasticity. In resource abundant economies costs might rise and 
currencies appreciate, before they develop a manufacturing base (Dutch disease). Economic growth 
might be too slow given the rise of population and speed of urbanization. In most cases import 
substitution strategies instead of export promotion have failed too. 
3. Dilemmas and Trade-offs 
Any development strategy faces not only the problems of diversity, inefficient structures and 
diverging opinions within Europe, but also certain dilemmas and trade-offs that characterize 
policies which a region is willing and able to implement for other countries. In the following 
analysis, we call the supporters the "steering region" and the country into which investment or 
finance flows the "recipient".  
“European Enlargement” vs. Partnership policy  
Europe was preoccupied in the last two decades with the enlargement of the EU, first to 
Southern European Countries, then to Central and Eastern Europe, and now to the West Balkan. It 
resulted in a parallel policy for neighbors at the periphery – outside of the geographical Europe – 
which had no desire, and only remote chances, of eventually becoming members. Over the years the 
ENP has evolved as an alternative for accession but could still be viewed as an attempt to replicate 
the basic recipe for enlargement policy through exporting its norms, values and regulations. Cadier 
(2013) argues that partnership policies should rather “move away from the ghost of enlargement 
and function as a more coherent and assertive foreign policy instrument”.  
Trade-off between trade and migration 
An important issue in international economics is the trade-off between the movements of 
products and production factors. Model analyses showed that substitution prevails under low trade 
barriers and complementarity under high trade barriers, while a change from the low to the high 
tariff region or vice versa can result in either substitution or complementarity. According to 
Felbermayr et al. (2012), a crucial implication for migration policy is that restrictions on 
immigration may be foiled unless trade is restricted as well. In an empirical analysis of post-WWII 
developments, the data seem to reject substitutability, while they do not reject complementarity. 
Empirical investigations by Lund (2009), employing a gravity model approach for a selection of 
five EU countries, resulted in unequivocal support of the complementarity hypothesis. Although 
complementarity is weaker where free movement of goods and people are allowed, a policy 
conclusion holds for the EU: Migration is a potential source of welfare gains but will come hand in 
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hand with income redistribution and wealth losses for specific groups of the society, demanding in 
turn compensatory policy measures. 
Need for conditionality vs. prevention of imperialistic attitudes 
The countries in the steering position are spending their taxpayers’ money, which requires 
well-defined objectives and control of the flows. Recipients, on the other hand, have their own 
goals, historical priorities, organization and management, and thus favor a set of conditions which 
may be different from those of the steering group. A complete absence of conditions is obviously 
neither acceptable for the donor nor optimal for the recipient. A fair process of cooperatively 
defining goals involves admitting that joint learning is essential to overcoming the trade-off.  A fair 
solution may be to switch to a "more for more" approach which is activating, while the alternative 
"less for less" policy is discouraging (Koenig, 2017; Morrissey, 2005; Watt, 2005). It should 
eventually result in replacing conditionality (as imposed by the IMF in the Structural Adjustment 
Programs) with a more symmetrical process of negotiated conditions. While in the past the SAPs 
may even have fostered unstable political systems, inefficient economies and corruption (Bodomo, 
2017), today the programs of the IMF and the ENP are definitely more sensitive to national 
priorities.  
Modern industrial structures vs. upgrading agriculture and SMEs  
In the globalized world, large enterprises with networks of supply and distribution dominate 
world markets. In emerging economies, small and medium-sized firms prevail, often producing 
agricultural products or selling only regionally; they are less efficient and lack any export 
experience, but are well adapted to local needs, resources and knowledge. Increasing the scope of 
activities is easier if technology is imported, but endogenous technologies would provide a more 
sustainable competitive position. The need to strengthen the productive and technological basis is 
emphasized by “structuralist economics”, an approach developed by economists in international 
organizations which stretches from its foundation by Raúl Prebisch to new structural economics 
(Lin, 2015). 
Importing best technology vs. endogenous development 
A trade-off exists between rapid development via imported technology versus protracted 
progress through endogenous technologies, thereby creating a more sustainable competitive 
advantage. The industrial policy in East Asia has successfully applied a strategy of copying plus 
improving and adapting (in a non-linear way bringing in new aspects). Digitalization can also be 
steered toward different uses; it can either diminish employment due to higher efficiency levels or 
create new products and jobs serving heterogeneous preferences. International technology usually 
boosts labor and capital productivity, while for emerging economies it would be preferable to 
enhance resource and energy productivity. Innovation, education and a reformed tax structure could 
support the "redirection of the technical progress". Favoring resource and energy productivity 
reduces emissions and would lead to a trajectory different from that of quick-starting development 
via technology imports. 
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Copying industrialized countries vs. heterogeneous visions of progress 
Foreign dominance is not acceptable in the long run, but narrow-minded inward orientation 
has disadvantages too, as leading families, tribes and male networks tend to control the political 
system. The role of woman will remain traditional and family-centered, young people have to 
closely follow the tradition of their peers. The trade-off is between relying on pre-set foreign 
standards or developing a vision based on regional needs. The latter will lead to diversity in the 
social and economic systems. In management science this is regarded as an advantage for firms 
which may also have positive repercussions for societies and development. External pressure, 
global financial markets and international agreements accelerate change; a national vision can make 
development compatible with cultural habits and different development trajectories. Partnerships 
should respect or even support visions of the recipient country, but also offer the value system of 
the steering country as one pillar of new synergies. 
Improving energy grids vs. developing decentralized alternatives 
Raising incomes and boosting internationalization, closing trade deficits and increasing 
employment in the export sector increase the demand for energy, transport and energy-intensive 
basic goods. Water usage for large-scale agricultural production and evolving cities explode, 
leading to water abstraction, the straightening of rivers and building of huge dams. Yet alternatives 
exist which promote cooperation between small farmers, handicraft producers and small firms inter 
alia in the energy sector. Decentralized energy production using solar or wind technology reduces 
the need for power grids and pipelines, all the more if storage facilities improve. Countries catching 
up could become experienced platforms for new technologies also needed in industrialized 
countries. The trade-off between known, efficient technologies (with economies of scale and 
powerful grids) versus alternative decentralized technologies becomes more visible when the long-
term "external" effects for society and the climate are highlighted by national and international 
emissions trading or taxes.  
Family planning vs. overpopulation  
High rates of global economic growth during recent decades and the UN millennium goals 
have led to declining child mortality and to longer life expectancy, which has contributed to rapidly 
rising populations, specifically in Africa. Catching up in terms of income per head and increasing 
female employment rates are curtailed by rapidly increasing populations. Development (specifically 
education) may reduce the number of births per woman, as formal employment, nascent health and 
pension systems reduce the importance of offspring as a form of old-age protection. The trade-off 
between increasing populations and social progress was addressed by China in its "one-child 
policy". As an alternative route to reducing births, Sachs (2005) has emphasized the importance of 
educating women. 
Summing up, even if they cannot be eliminated, these dilemmas should be kept in mind in a 
European partnership strategy with its neighbors. Formulating them first, perhaps in a dichotomous 
way, is helpful for overcoming them later, at least partially. 
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4. The Level for Designing and Negotiating the Partnership  
When negotiating a partnership model with European neighbors, a number of possible 
constellations may come into play: contracts can be drawn up between individual countries or 
between the EU and a block of countries or any combination thereof. In addition, private partners 
may also be involved. And it must be acknowledged that solutions need not cover total countries 
but could pertain to sub-national regions or local experiments. 
Bloc to bloc (industrialized vs. developing countries): The most comprehensive approach 
would be an agreement between one multilateral organization of the steering bloc and one of the 
recipient regions. Such a solution would bundle interests on both sides and design the strategy by 
means of bilateral negotiations.  Operationalization and monitoring success would be easier than in 
the case of decentralized models. The disadvantage of this solution is that a consensus may be 
difficult, first within both groups and then between them. Trade deals (TTIP, CETA) come nearest 
to this model and some of their problems would extend to development assistance.  
Europe to bloc, to regional blocs, to country (decentralization on the recipient side): Trade 
agreements, technology transfer and security issues are often discussed between a European 
organization and a group of neighboring countries. Both partners profit if they cooperate with other 
international organizations, but even Europe does not speak with a single voice; this is 
demonstrated by the distribution of competencies within the EU Commission, where four 
Commissioners are responsible for external relations.  
Bilateral (country to country): Some countries in Europe have closer relations with individual 
countries or sub-regions in the neighborhood. It makes sense to use these relations to upgrade the 
partnership between Europe and its neighbors. New bilateral negotiations have arisen as a result of 
recent migration flows. This led to questions of border control, the existence of inhumane refugee 
camps and forced repatriation. In some cases, Europe pays countries (e.g. Turkey) for not allowing 
migrants to transit to EU Member States. 
Private donors/NGOs/ sponsoring, responsible investment: An increasing number of initiatives 
come from non-governmental organizations. Some are truly international in nature and have a 
specific focus (social, environmental and/or political), others are very specialized, either in terms of 
their purpose or region. Prominent sponsors are engaged in the transfer of technologies (access to 
water, waste and hygiene without water) that save lives. Some pension funds and sovereign 
investment funds invest in certified responsible projects, excluding projects with negative social or 
environmental impacts. A multitude of initiatives stem independently from recipient countries
3
, but 
these also require funding, knowledge transfers or at least recognition.  
  
                                                 
3
 Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) and Omega Plan for Africa the New African Initiative (NAI), 
African Development Bank, Initiative for East and South Africa.  
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5. Funding Required and Methods to Raise It 
The financial range to be mobilized for implementing a European partnership policy is not 
easy to determine, as is it not trivial to estimate how much is being spent already today. Among the 
reasons are the following: (i) the financial requirements depend on the ambition of whether to 
provide only short-term relief or a deeper strategic change improving the situation also in the long 
run; (ii) most estimates are regionally limited; (iii) estimates may refer to development assistance, 
partly also to peace building as well as military and security expenditures, or include support after 
catastrophes and epidemics; (iv) flows are often cumulated over a period, they can refer to 
investment or include operational costs; (v) costs may be covered by internal financing or depend 
on public spending and capital markets; (vi) figures can refer to actual expenditures or just plans. 
The financial goal envisaged in this paper: We make the courageous assumption that an 
additional amount of EUR 100 billion per annum would be required for indispensable investments 
and operational costs. This money should particularly be spent on long-run projects including 
upgrading skills, schools, management expertise and governance. The geographical reach is the 
European neighborhood as defined earlier. Money spent on security and refugee programs, fighting 
illegal human trafficking and smuggling remain outside of this estimate. The EUR 100 billion 
assumption looks ambitious in relation to existing programs, but is a lower guess compared to the 
USD 600 billion estimated by the UN for achieving the SDGs and the 20 million jobs needed 
annually in Africa alone
4
. EUR 100 billion would be equivalent to 3% of the current GDP of Africa 
plus Middle East and 0.6% of Europe’s GDP. 
Estimate of current efforts: For the period 2014-2020, the overall financing of external 
activities from the EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) is targeted at 
EUR 82 billion. Funding flows through various instruments which are organized according to 
thematic and geographical topics
5
. The majority of these instruments is at least partly concerned 
with neighborhood and development issues.  On an annual basis, official development aid by the 
EU, including bilateral ODA from Member States, is estimated to amount to some EUR 20 billion
6
. 
According to the European Commission, spending on behalf of the European neighborhood for the 
period 2014-2020 is mobilized through the External Financing Instruments (EFI) in the amount of 
EUR 17.4 billion, composed of EUR 15.4 billion via the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) 
and EUR 2.0 billion via the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) plus some funds for the migration 
compact.  All these figures are cumulated over the planning period and have to be divided by seven 
to obtain an average annual flow.  After excluding expenditures for military and humanitarian help, 
the existing expenditures for the European neighborhood are in the range of EUR 10 billion per 
year. 
                                                 
4 The World Economic Forum (2017) estimates that some "15 to 20 million increasingly well-educated 
young people are expected to join the African workforce every year for the next three decades" (p.9). 
5 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/sources-funding_en 
6 The Africa-EU Partnership, see http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/financing-
partnership . 
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Closing the gap to the goal for development assistance (ODA spending): Most rich countries 
have by far missed the UN goal of spending 0.7% of GNI on development assistance. The countries 
in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donated only 0.31% of GNI in 2017); for 
the EU the figure is 0.49%. To approach the targeted level of spending from EU countries alone 
would thus require some EUR 28 billion annually of additional funding. Since national budgets are 
strained and most member countries attempt to cut deficits, the additional expenditure must be 
financed by cutting other expenditures. Obvious candidates would be cutting subsidies for 
agriculture which would yield a double dividend since it reduced the harm currently afflicted to 
agriculture e.g. in Africa. 
Extending the idea of the "Juncker Fund": The Juncker Investment Plan for Europe, with the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) as its major pillar, was designed to deploy 
EUR 5 billion of European Investment Bank (EIB) resources and EUR 16 billion of guarantees to 
trigger, over a three year period, EUR 100 billion per year in economic activity (European 
Commission, 2014).  
Inspired by the success of the Juncker Investment Plan, the European Fund for Sustainable 
Development (EFSD) was launched in September 2017. It intends to boost private and public 
investment in partner countries to address some of the obstacles to growth and root causes of 
irregular migration. With an input of EUR 4.1 billion from the EU budget and the EDF, cumulative 
investments of EUR 44 billion are expected over several years. If Member States match the EU 
contribution, the overall result could also double to EUR 88 billion (Chadwick, 2017). Extensions 
of this concept should be explored and marketed to international investors, but also government, 
civil society, youth and NGOs in all partnership countries. 
New financial products: A major source of the funds needed could be provided by various new 
capital market instruments, such as the so-called Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) which could 
stimulate private and institutional investors to commit themselves to investments in the regions 
neighboring Europe. Take as an example the EIB Climate Awareness Bond, which is a form of 
Green Bond
7
. The EIB has collected over EUR 11 billion by emitting Green Bonds, EUR 3.8 billion 
in 2016 alone. The same could be done by offering an African/Middle East Development Bond, 
which could collect some EUR 1 billion per year, given that these bonds will furnish higher interest 
as the projects are riskier, but can be secured by the guarantees of international institutions and the 
EU. A common European bond for Africa would be much easier for Member States to implement 
and accept than Eurobonds.  
Closing loopholes, illegal transactions, tax shelters: We aim to finance investments in general 
by avoiding additional taxes, as the tax level in Europe is already high. An exception could be an 
international tax on financial transactions. Here, an EU initiative could be successful, given Brexit 
and the sympathetic new government in France. Fighting tax evasion could be another revenue 
source without burdening the taxpayer, but its possible receipts have already been claimed for many 
other purposes.  
                                                 
7 http://www.eib.org/eib.org/investor_relations/cab/index.htm  
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Redirecting money parked in successor funds of the US Marshall Plan: Finally, across Europe, 
the funds accruing from debt redemption of old Marshall Plan continue to be reinvested on a 
revolving principle. For example, in January 2007 the German government reorganized the ERP 
Special Fund and contributed EUR 4.65 billion to the acting bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) as equity capital and EUR 3.25 billion as subordinated loans. In many European countries, 
the old funds are still available and could be redirected to Europe’s neighbors.  
Summing up: All the resources mobilized can be expected to have positive second-order 
effects if stability and dynamics increase, and organization and governance are improved. Although 
the proposed amount of an additional EUR 100 billion per year may seem ambitious, it is not 
beyond reach if the strategy for the European neighborhood is comprehensive, includes civil society 
and relies on innovative experiments including reforms in Europe as well. 
6. Analysis of Similar Neighborhood Compacts 
The success of the post-war US Marshall Plan has induced follow-ups, be it for the developing 
world as a whole or for a specific region. In recent years, proposals have centered on Africa. We 
mention three initiatives by the German government, the Senat der Wirtschaft -jointly with the Club 
of Rome-, and the Friends of Europe. 
The German "Marshall Plan mit Afrika": The initiative of the German Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ, 2017) calls for a Marshall Plan with Africa resting on three 
pillars: (i) economics, trade and employment, (ii) peace and security, and (iii) democracy and the 
rule of law. Arms exports should be reduced, tax shelters closed, and illegal transactions stopped. 
The African Union (AU) and existing regional organizations should negotiate an African 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)
8
. Existing funds and facilities for Africa should be utilized, in 
particular the African Peace Facility (APF), the Bekou Trust Fund, the EUTF fund (which addresses 
the causes of migration, but also illegal migration) and the EIP in general. The title of the plan was 
eventually changed from plan for Africa, to Plan with Africa to avoid any pretense of patronizing by 
Germany.  
Senat der Wirtschaft/Club of Rome: The paper by Senat der Wirtschaft (2016) also envisages a 
kind of Marshall Plan for Africa.  The plan centers geographically on North Africa and the MENA 
region, and refers to the Sahara and the Arab desert, a Joker for Africa’s future since these regions 
could potentially provide any energy needed without resorting to fossil-based sources.  
Friends of Europe: The proposal issued by Hughes (2017) is closer to the Senat proposal, 
though with a broader pro-future strategy; it has comparable goals, but a different underlying 
philosophy if compared with the document of the German government. Maybe its most important 
point is a vivid critique of the recent preoccupation of EU policy in relation to Africa with the 
problem of EU-inward migration (the "refugee problem"). An important proposal is to rely less on 
negative conditionality ("less if less") and more on positive conditionality ("more for more").  
                                                 
8
 The main objectives of the CFTA are to create a single continental market for goods and services, with 
free movement of business persons and investments, and thus pave the way for accelerating the 
establishment of the Customs Union. 
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Renewed criticism of the patronizing approach of Europe arose specifically after the G20 
meeting in Germany in July 2017. To the disappointment of Africa, the documents presented had 
been worked out without the participation of African governments or its civic organizations 
(Collier, 2016). It would make sense if the process started with a summit during which African 
governments themselves could make commitments (presenting rules and guarantees). An even more 
fundamental criticism – following a line in development theory – is that help could in fact hurt more 
than improve the situation. Upgrading agriculture and better education are the keys to African 
development. There are currently many signs that Africa has already "woken up", at least in terms 
of young people being supported by civic society in many countries. The African Union’s Agenda 
2063 was a good start; many smaller and larger, private initiatives and NGOs have followed. 
7. Towards a New Approach 
Central to our proposal is that there is no single blueprint for a partnership and no single actor 
on either side. We feel, however, that a new strategy should be based on the following ten elements: 
(i) adopting a three-stage approach – decision of recipient countries, assistance program, 
partnership, (ii) applying a multi-level approach, (iii) favoring autonomous efforts of the recipient 
countries, (iv) assigning education and innovation as top priorities, (v) fostering Schumpeter–Al-
Idrisi exchange programs, (vi) striving for ecological sustainability, (vii) removing obstacles created 
by Europe, (viii) building trust, (ix) maintaining long-run goals even in the face of the refugee 
crisis, and (x) recognizing the importance of a European partnership policy for all member 
countries. 
Three-stage strategy: The process should ideally start with the decision by EU neighbors to 
focus on accelerating development and catching up. Following this "declaration of intent", Europe 
can fine-tune its strategy for assistance as well as its conditions for management and 
operationalization. This would allow assistance programs to deliver their full benefits without any 
paternalistic dominance by the steering countries. In the third phase, a true partnership of equals 
emerges, although the historical and cultural backgrounds and income levels may significantly 
diverge. 
The need for a multi-level approach: There is a multitude of actors on the steering side: the 
EU, international organizations, sponsors, NGOs and sector initiatives. And there are governments, 
regions, civic society and often local organizations on the recipient side. Waiting for agreements 
between all steering countries and all recipient countries would unduly delay assistance. 
Coordination bodies for each partner could accelerate the process. And international conferences 
and blueprints for treaties make sense if they coordinate rather than prevent multi-level activities. 
Autonomous components on the recipient side: Industrialized countries are inclined to assist 
other regions in catching up – based on a mix of egoistic and altruistic motives. The preferred long-
run strategy is to develop the recipients’ own priorities and alternative technologies. This enables 
more independent development and longer-lasting advantages circumventing “path dependency” of 
the incumbent. An autonomous component will best be furthered if governments refrain from top-
down strategies and encourage bottom-up elements. The participation of young people is necessary, 
women should play a larger role, NGOs have to be included.  
The all-important role of education, vocational training and innovation: Physical investments 
are the centerpieces of international cooperation programs, development assistance and catching up 
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ambitions. However, the most important driver of growth and wellbeing is education, defined in a 
broad sense, from early age to recurrent learning. Education helps improving health, reducing child 
mortality and extending life expectancy. Education is also the most humane way of reducing 
overpopulation, it erodes the power of inherited structures and clans, and works against prejudices 
as well as authoritarian rulers. Literacy enables communication, the use of new technologies and the 
positive consequences of digitalization. It is not only the average level of education that determines 
the performance of economies, but also its distribution. Educational choices are very much 
inherited, dependent on the educational level of the parents, on religion as well as regional 
characteristics.  
Schumpeter-Al-Idrisi exchange programs:
9
 The proposed program extends the idea of the 
Fulbright Program, which connected US academia with European elites. Europe should now invite 
its neighborhood to study at its universities, to exchange scholars individually or as whole classes, 
and provide inter-cultural holiday camps. Researchers and innovative employees should be invited 
to spend sabbaticals at European firms, business schools and government training academies. Split 
professorships should be envisaged, where professors recurrently spend one term in a neighborhood 
country and one at a European university. The well-proven system of vocational training should be 
offered to all neighbors interested, with European teachers setting up facilities in neighborhood 
countries if these countries invite them.  
The chances of sustainability, from decentralized energy to smart cities: Economic growth is 
often seen critically as it causes emissions, deforestation, land use and waste (the environmental 
footprint). It may also weaken personal contacts, empathy and leisure. Therefore, strategies have to 
be designed which rely on reduced emissions and improved social relations as drivers of 
development and assets to be exported. Africa can be the lab for a new sustainable development 
path, becoming the vanguard of locally produced alternative energy, successful reforestation, water 
sourcing and use under difficult circumstances.  
The necessity of removing obstacles created by European policy: Although Europe is already 
investing in, and cooperating with, its neighboring countries, it also has a number of regulations 
which tend to restrict development, specifically in Africa. Removing them could be optimal for both 
partners, and would cost less than large assistance programs, require less organizational effort and 
less micro-intervention. An important example is the European Common Agricultural Policy, which 
provides immense subsidies to large European farmers. Because of the resulting low prices, EU 
agricultural products are even sold in Africa, preventing endogenous production and local 
distribution or export to near neighbors. Africa is also hampering its own progress by subsidizing 
fossil-based technologies or allowing illegal capital exports and arms purchases (SIPRI, 2017). In 
international trade agreements, Europe usually does not consider upgrading standards, and there is 
no differentiation based on the production technique used. 
Building trust, improving the external view of Europe, partnership based on diversity: The 
relation between Europe and its neighborhood is coined by a dolorous history of conflicts, land and 
                                                 
9 Schumpeter (1883-1950) was an Austrian economist known for technical but also societal 
innovations.  Al-Idrisi was an African writer, cartographer and scientist with a multicultural 
background born in Ceuta in the year 1100. 
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resource grabbing and colonial regimes. Even if some of the problems originated long ago, it is vital 
to work on regaining or establishing trust at all levels, from governments, to media, schools and 
companies. The Schumpeter-Al-Idrisi program would work in this direction, but it requires 
intensive efforts, and any drive to fall back on old patronizing ideas is a threat capable of 
undermining the recovery of trust.  
Long-run goals should not be overruled by the refugee crisis: The long-run goals of a 
European neighborhood strategy also contribute to solving the refugee crisis, as dynamic growth in 
the neighborhood weakens the motives for emigration and promotes the integration of migrants in 
Europe. In the last two years, policies have increasingly resorted to solving the refugee crisis by 
"bribing" governments in the neighborhood to hinder refugees from leaving their country, even by 
locking them up in internment camps. This is not optimal for Europe, since it prevents early 
integration and better allocation of migrants according to their skills and to job opportunities in 
Europe.  
Finally, partnership policy is an integral part of a responsible European globalization 
strategy.  All European countries should be involved, not only those “closer” to the neighborhood 
or the richer ones. Instruments and principles that facilitate long-run and deep transitions should be 
respected e.g. bundling reforms, engaging new actors (young people, women, NGOs, grassroots 
movements, the internet generation and social media). The progress should be measured not by 
GDP growth but by sustainable development targets, aiming for comprehensive goals and being 
open to compromises (Aiginger, 2016). 
8. Conclusions 
The European Union has to redefine its internal strategy, so as to overcome its growth fatigue 
and reconnect its members with the European “project” of promoting peace and openness. The US - 
retreating from multilateralism and globalization- and the ambition for world leadership on the part 
of China, as well as new technological trends, climate change and migration make it necessary but 
also profitable for Europe to look for new partners.  
The first central message is that partnership will only work under strategies developed by each 
partner independently and then coordinated to create optimal synergies. In a world of large 
uncertainties, technical innovations, migration and climate change, it is important that both sides of 
a partnership learn and be prepared to adapt policy decisions and instruments.  
The second conclusion is that this strategy will be advantageous for Europe as well as its 
neighborhood in Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa.  A positive development in the neighborhood 
will increase European growth; it will make the migration flows manageable for Europe since it will 
upgrade the qualifications of inward migrants which Europe needs to stabilize its population.  
Third, a partnership strategy requires Europe to remove obstacles to the endogenous 
development of partners specifically in Africa, such as its high subsidies for agricultural products 
and willingness of European Banks to accept illegal capital exports by neighbors.  On the active 
side, Europe cannot offer military intervention, and also not invest as heavily in physical 
infrastructure as China.  Its strengths are its practical education, inclusiveness and rule of law. 
Europe and its new partners should make use of the advantages of decarbonization, investing in 
decentralized renewable energy, and more efficient use of mineral resources and water.  
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Fourth, we estimate that additional investments of Europe in the neighborhood of about 100 
billion € per year are necessary.  This sounds like a large effort, but development assistance is 
currently far below past commitments, international investors are looking for investment 
opportunities outside the dollar area, and an External Investment Fund for sustainable development 
has been initiated.  New “responsible bonds” can be created and guaranteed by the European 
Monetary System. 
Converting a “ring of fire” into a “ring of friends” is possible and feasible with a new 
partnership between Europe and its neighbors. This will also help mitigate climate change and make 
globalization more inclusive and responsible. 
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